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ARGUMENT
I. REPLY TO THE STATE'S ARGUMENT CONCERNING MR.
GALLUP'S COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE OF ALIBI
STATUTE.
The State appears to agree with Mr. Gallup's interpretation of the alibi
statute which is that a a defendant in a criminal proceeding may always testify in
his own behalf concerning alibi i.e. where he was at the time of the alleged crime,
regardless of whether he has provided the State with advance written notice of his
testimony. This is clearly an interpretation which the plain wording of the statute,
rules, and case law, both in this state and other jurisdictions, supports.
However, the State takes issue with an advance proffer of testimony
provided to the trial court by Mr. Gallup's attorney. The State highlights the
language of the statute which states that an alibi defense refers to any evidence that
a defendant was at some "specific" place other than the scene of the crime, and
then argues that since Mr. Gallup's attorney did not adequately proffer his client's
testimony in advance to the effect that Mr. Gallup would testify that he was at
some other specific place, and because - after the court instructed Mr. Gallup that
he could not testify that he was at some other specific place - Mr. Gallup only
testified that he was not the driver of the vehicle, that therefore no harm was done.
The State argues that the issue is therefore moot and unripe because he never
proposed in advance any testimony within reach of the alibi statute. In sum, the

State argues that the court's ruling, even if erroneous, did not affect Mr. Gallup's
testimony.
In reply thereto, Mr. Gallup argues that his right to testify is a fundamental
constitutional right guaranteed by the due process clauses of the Utah and federal
constitutions, and that any infringement thereof should be treated with the strictest
scrutiny. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 107 S. Ct. 2704, 97 L. Ed. 2d 37
(1987). It is clearfromthe record that the trial court did interpret the alibi statute
to restrict Mr. Gallup's testimony so that he could not testify that he was at a
specific place other than the crime scene. The trial court communicated this
instruction to Mr. Gallup and his attorney, and Mr. Gallup thereafter testified in
conformity with the court's ruling.
The State's argument that the error, if any, was harmless because Mr.
Gallup's attorney did not make a proffer of Mr. Gallup's testimony falling within
the ambit of the alibi statute, is misguided because it basically would require a
defendant in every criminal proceeding to give the State and the trial court advance
notice of his testimony whenever he wants to assert an alibi defense. Under the
due process clauses of the Utah Constitution and United States Constitution every
defendant has the right to remain silent up until the point he takes the witness
stand, and this right extends to all pretrial proceedings. Mr. Gallup was not

required to let the court and the State know in advance what his exact testimony
would be, and the plain language of the alibi statute supports this conclusion.
Further, Mr. Gallup's attorney did not proffer exactly what Mr. Gallup
would testify to. He merely said, "I believe that his testimony is going to be that..
." and "I can't tell you exactly what his testimony will be, but I expect that his
testimony will be t h a t . . . ." (Emphasis added). Mr. Gallup's attorney was a
public defender and no doubt was not as intricately aware of what his client's
testimony would be until Mr. Gallup took the stand. Defendants are not even
required to give advance notice of testimony to their own attorneys, and more often
than not defendants testify differently to what counsel was expecting. Further,
counsel should have been permitted to try and refresh Mr. Gallup's testimony
while Mr. Gallup was on the stand.
In sum, the court's ruling was error and plain error at that. Mr. Gallup
testified in compliance with that ruling, and counsel never attempted to have Mr.
Gallup try and remember where he was on the day in question because the court
had ruled out the possibility of that line of questioning. Mr. Gallup's fundamental
constitutional right to testify was infringed. His testimony cannot be restricted by
counsel's pretrial proffer, especially when Mr. Gallup was not required to give
anybody any advance notice of his testimony, including alibi testimony.

II. REPLY TO THE STATE'S ARGUMENT CONCERNING MR.
GALLUP'S PRE-ARREST RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT.
The State argues that Mr. Gallup's act of hanging up the phone on the
investigating police officer did not constitute an invocation of his right to remain
silent because it was not done expressly and unambiguously, the situation did not
give right to a prearrest right to remain silent, Mr. Gallup took the stand and
thereby subjected himself to cross examination, and/or even if it did the error was
harmless beyond reasonable doubt because other evidence of guilt was
overwhelming.
The cases which provide that invocation of therightto silence must be
express and unambiguous are mostly cases where the defendant is in a custodial
situation and therefore implicate the post-arrest right to remain silent. In these
cases law enforcement is required to read Miranda rights to the defendant which
includes the right to remain silent. It therefore makes sense that, after having been
read that right, a defendant with knowledge of that right expressly and
unambiguously invokes it. However, in the prearrest situation no such rights have
been read, and therefore defendants may not know that they have the right to
remain silent. They may just feel like not responding to an officer's questions
because they sense that their answers may incriminate them. Because the courts
have held that a prearrest right to remain silent exists, and because no Miranda
rights are read, then defendants
A

should be able to assert their right to remain silent using their conduct, not just
words e.g. hanging up a phone.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons this court should reverse Mr. Gallup's convictions.
DATED this «?

day of _ ^ ^

=

__

9

2011.

Anthony V. Rippa/Brook J. Sessions
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I do hereby certify that on the 4 day of ,^%r^e_ , 2011,1 did cause
(2) true and correct copies of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF to be deposited
the US Mail, postage prepaid, addressed to, or otherwise served in accordance
Utah law on, the following recipients:
Office of the Utah Attorney General
Attorneys for Appellee
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

^^^3
Anthony V. Rippa/Brook J. Sessions
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM

-53whatever, I'm -- the State is concerned, certainly, if he's
testifying that the State has not received any notice of alibi,
if that's -- I think -- I don't know any other way to not go
into that .
THE COURT: Let's get a microphone there.

Yeah.

So

your concern is that his testimony may -MR. JOHNSON: I think, unless he asks him what time
of day it is today or something, that, if he talks about the
incident, it's going to necessarily implicate whether or not he
was present in the vehicle; and if not, then he's talking about
an alibi defense.
12:20.

That's news to the State as of January 5th at

So I think under the rule 7 7-14-2, that we need to have

that notice at least ten days before trial, so we can research
and investigate what he may be claiming.
THE COURT: It's a valid concern, Mr. Sessions.

Is

your client going to --- with regard to the incident, not the
phone call, I assume, but with regard to the incident, is he
going to testify with regard to anything that would be an
alibi, indicating he wasn't in the car that night?

Because

if it goes that direction, I think the State's correct; it's
an alibi.
MR. SESSIONS: I think -THE COURT: I guess the second question is, is he also
intending to testify about the telephone call.

Hypothetically,

if that was al] he wanted to testify about, I think I would

-54probably end up ruling that that opened the door for testimony
about everything, or questions from the State about everything.
MR. SESSIONS: That's a --- goes along the lines of the
conversation that I was having with him, because in regards to
him, my client wanting to testify, it is to the issue of to the
telephone, because he wants to explain why he would elect not
to talk to trie officer on the telephone.
I had a talk with him about limiting that in the
scope, in which I would on direct.

Then the question on cross

examination of whether or not the Court was going to allow it
or not, that may go to the point where the State is asking
questions that would illicit an alibi of defense, meaning an
alibi as to "Someone else was in the car," or "I wasn't in the
car."
THE COURT: Right.

I think whether the State illicits

the alibi defense or you do, I think the notice issue is still
there.

I think if he's going to testify in any way, shape or

form with regard to an alibi, then -- I'm sorry, he doesn't
have all of his code books out here -- but I think if he's
going to testify as to an alibi, the notice is there.

You've

got the statute up, Mr. -MR. JOHNSON: I do, Judge, under 77-14-2, the defendant
-- under subsection (1) "The defendant, whether or not written
demand has been made, who intends to offer evidence of an
alibi, shall not less then ten days before trial or at such

-55time as the Court may allow, file and serve on the prosecuting
attorney a notice in writing of his intention to claim alibi.
The notice shall contain specific information as to the place
where the defendant claims to have been at the alleged offense
-- time of the alleged offense, and as particularly as it's
known to the defendant or his attorney the names and addresses
of the witnesses by whom he purposed to establish that alibi."
Then it goes into what our duty is of the State to rebut that.
Under subsection (3) "If a defendant or prosecuting
attorney fails to comply with the requirements of the section,
the Court may exclude evidence offered to establish or rebut
alibi.

However the defendant may always testify on his own

behalf concerning alibi."
Then under subsection (4), it says,

vx

The Court may,

for good cause shown, waive the requirements of the section."
The State would argue there is no good cause.

This has been

going on for a while.
THE COURT: Do you want me to get a copy of the code so
you can look at the whole thing?
MR. SESSIONS: We need to look at that, because it
sounds to me like the defendant can always testify, according
to that code section.

Let me just be a little more clear,

too, because I had not intended that my client would need to
testify.

If I had been successful on the objection to the

foundation and the phone call evidence coming in, he would

-56have had no reason to testify, and he would not have been
test ifying.
T HE C 0URT: Uh-huh.
MR. SESSIONS: But because I was overruled on that,
and that evidence came in, it appears necessary that he does
testify.

I would like to limit it to the specific testimony

related to the telephone call; but the Court has opined that
its likely that that would open the door for all questions.

I

think we need to look at the code section.
MR. JOHNSON: It's 77-14 -THE COURT: Okay, could I have the red book back?
77 is here.

Oh, gosh, it's 1997.

Oh,

Judge Davis, why have you

got that?
MR. SESSIONS: Its 77-14-2?

Great, then I'll put it in

my book.
THE COURT: Has it been amended anytime recently?
MR. JOHNSON: In 1980.
THE COURT: That's not recent.
MR. JOHNSON: So

Okay, we're good.

N

97 would be accurate.

THE COURT: Yeah.
MR. JOHNSON: Surprisingly enough.
THE COURT: Yeah, it's not in here.
this one here.

Let me go back to

No, they skip past it in both of these.

Would

you go borrow Judge Davis' Volume 4.
MR. SESSIONS: While she's getting that, your Honor, I

-57would supplement my argument that my client doesn't have a
specific person who he's going to refer to and say, "I was
with this per son on such and such a night, : which would be an
alibi.

In fact, I believe that his testimony is going to be

that he is going to not recall exactly where he was on that
n ight .

These charges were brought in March from an event in
October, and I can't tell you exactly what his testimony will
be, but I expect that his testimony will be something along
the lines of "I don't recall where I was that night.
in Utah County.
specifics of

I wasn't

I wasn't driving the vehicle;" but as to

NV

I was with so and so at this location at this

time," that will not be his testimony.
I think given how procedurally this has ended up
before the Court at trial, the exception does apply, but the
defendant may always testify as to an alibi.
COURT CLERK: (Inaudible).
THE COURT: Okay, that: will work.
MR. JOHNSON: I guess, Judge, if he's —

his proffer

is, as it seems quite vague, I guess the State doesn't -- even
if we had that information, that would not go to the purpose
and heart and spirit of the statute.

So the State would not

object.
Certainly if he gets up there and says,

M

I was at the

Gallivan Center on that day," then that's where I think the

•58fundamental and fairness and surprise comes to the State.

So

I'll leave that up to the Court to rule.
THE COURT: I note th - 1 -

11

- i

14-2 says that "The notice

shall contain specific information as to the place where the
defendant claims to Yiave been at the time of the alleged
6

offense, and as particularly as is known to the defendant or

7

his attorney the names and addresses of the witnesses by whom

8

he purposes to establish an alibi."

9

So if his testimony is, "I don't remember where I was

10

that night," I think that doesn't constitute an alibi; but I

11

think for him to say,

12

wasn't in Utah County that night," is by inference to say, "I

13

wa s somewhere else."

XX

I wasn't in my car that night, and I

14

So I think for him. to be specific enough to say, "I

15

wasn't there," so ergo, "I was somewhere else," I think that

16

starts to go towards an alibi; but I think If he just wants to

17

say,

18

probably safe.

XX

I don't remember where I was that night," I think that's

19

MR. JOHNSON: That's fine with the State.

20

MR. SESSIONS: Your Honor, I think --

21

THE COURT: And doesn't need notice.

22

MR. SESSIONS: -- if he were saying, "I wasn't there,

23

but I was at this location, and sc and so witnessed me at that

24

location," that's clearly an alibi.
"OURT: Riant

-59MR. SESSIONS: But if he rust says, 'VI wasn't there.

I

think I was at this location, but nobody was there," that's an
explanation but not an alibi, as I would understand alibi in
the statute.
THE COURT: Weil, but if he says, "I was at another
location," and that notice had been given, they could go to
that location and investigate.
MR. SESSIONS: But if he says,

NV

I was at my home that

night," how would they be able to go to that location -MR. JOHNSON: Well, because -MR. SESSIONS: -- and know he was there or not there on
that night?
MR. JOHNSON: Well, because the officers actually did,
and he wasn't there.

So -- but we did do that.

So he can say

that if he wants.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. SESSIONS: And we'll go to there.
THE COURT: So as far as any testimony that places him
definitely somewhere else, 1 think that constitutes at least a
partial alibi; and notice should have been given to the State
so that they could either check out that story or not, as the
case may be.
Now apparently there's testimony that the officer
could give that hasn't been given, that they went to the home
that niqht?

-60MR. JOHNSON: What it is, is it would be hearsay,
because it was other officers who went.

Again, part of this

investigation was trying to find the number.

Contacted other

troopers who went to his Murray address that he had on his
driver's license, and said, "Go to there, see if the car's
there, see if the defendant's there."

That was within --

OFFICER CLANTON: It was about the same time.

We were

at the office and called.
MR. JOHNSON: So within an hour.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. JOHNSON: They knocked on the door, they looked in
the garage.
MR. SESSIONS: Two of them 'went, a Sergeant and another
trooper.
MR. JOHNSON: So we would want to bring them in, but

—

THE COURT: You haven't been given notice.
MR. JOHNSON: Yeah, that's the -MR. SESSION: But if we got to that point, your Honor,
that was the address the DMV had.
current address.

That was not my client's

He had moved from that residence.

course he wouldn't have been at that residence.

So of

I mean, we

are kind of getting down to a tangential line there.
MR. JOHNSON: At some point when you say, "You know
what, I have no idea 'where I was.

It was a year and a half

ago," but then you could say at the same time, "but I know

-61for sure I wasn't there.

I wasn't in Utah County.

I wasn't

driving," it seems to speak out both sides of his mouth, and
that's where -THE COURT: I don't think you can have it both ways,
Mr. Sessions.
MR. SESSIONS: Pardon me?
THE COURT: I think you can have it both ways.

I think

he either testifies he doesn't have a memory or he doesn't know
where he was that night, or he doesn't testify as to where he
was that night, because if he is going to say, "I was at a
specific place that night,'7 then the State should have had
notice and should have had an opportunity to do whatever
investigation they wanted to do in order to try and either
corroborate his story, or.to debunk his story; but I don't -I don't think he can have it both ways.

So that's his choice.

MR. SESSIONS: Well, your Honor, I would argue that
the defendant always does have the right to explain himself,
because he is the defendant in a criminal case and has that
right.

That's an exception in the statute.
I would also argue that simply not knowing where you

are specifically doesn't mean that you can't exclude other
places.

He could say, "Well, I know I wasn't in Switzerland

that night, because I've never

been to Switzerland."

He could

say, "I know 1 wasn't in Utah County, because I had no reason
to go to Utah County."

N

\I know I wasn't in Canada, but I don't

-62Know exactly where I was.

I was somewhere else."

I believe that he should be allowed to testify to
that, because he should be allowed to answer the questions
against him.

I understand the alibi statute is in place so

that the officers can do an appropriate investigation, but also
the defendant doesn't have a burden of proof, and the defendant
has the right to remain silent.

The defendant doesn't have to

help the officers in all of their investigation.
I would argue that if he has a specific location and a
specific person who that they could check out, that it would be
reasonable for them to check out, then the statute requires him
to divulge that information; but if he had general information
that says,

VX

I don't know where I was, but I wasn't there," that

is a reasonable testimony from, a defendant.
THE COURT: No, that/s different from what I was saying.
MR. SESSIONS: Okay.
THE COURT: Okay, what I was saying is, sure, if he
says -- well, I was working on the assumption that he was going
to say he was specifically somewhere else.
testimony is,

I guess if his

SN

1 just know I wasn't on the freeway that night.

I don't know where I was, but I wasn't on the freeway that
night," I think that/s probably allowable.
MR. SESSIONS: Okay.
THE COURT: But if he starts to establish that he was
someplace where they could have investigated, that becomes an

-63alibi , i n m y o p i n., o r, .
MR. SESSIONS: Okay.
THE COURT: I don't read the -- be quiet, Mr. Gallup.
I don't, read the sentence "However, the defendant may always
testify on his own behalf concerning alibi" as something that
negates the previous two paragraphs.

1 think that just simply

means if he wants to establish his own alibi and doesn't have
other witnesses he may do so, but he still has to give notice.
So in hi.s testimony today, if he wants to get up and
say either

XV

I don't have a memory of where I w a s , " or "I know

I wasn't on the freeway that night; don't know where I was,
but I wasn't on the freeway," I mean, if he just wants to do a
blanket denial that he was speeding, I don't think the statute
precludes him from doing that.
I would strike any testimony that starts to establish
a place where he was that night, as opposed to being on the
freeway at the time the officer was chasing this particular
vehicle that was registered to him.

Otherwise, that

an alibi and notice has not been given, okay?

approaches

So have we

worked our way through that one?
(Counsel conferring off the record)
THE COURT: I'm ready to move on, folks.
jury coming back in less then 50 minutes.

We've got a

Okay, as to the jury

instructions, I am a little concerned, since identity is not -identity is very important in this case, we don't have a long

